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Kingdom of Trolls?
Influence Operations in the Saudi Twittersphere
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University of Edinburgh, UK
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Saudi Arabia has one of the highest rates of Twitter penetration in the world.
Despite high levels of repression, the platform is frequently used to discuss political
topics. Recent disclosures from Twitter have revealed state-backed attempts at
distorting the online information environment through influence operations (IOs).
A growing body of research has investigated online disinformation and foreign-
sponsored IOs in the English-speaking world; but comparatively little is known
about online disinformation in other contexts or about the domestic use of IOs.
Using public releases of IO tweets, we investigate the extent of such activity in
Saudi Arabia. Benchmarking these tweets to four samples of Saudi Twitter users,
we find that engagement with IO accounts was lower than engagement with the
average user, but equal to engagement with news accounts. Network analysis
reveals that engagement with IO accounts was largely driven by a small number
of influential accounts.
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From September 2019 to April 2020 Twitter announced three public disclosures of now-
suspended Twitter accounts attributed to organized state-backed “information operations” orig-
inating in Saudi Arabia (Twitter, 2020).1 Included in the first of these releases was the official
account of Saud al-Qahtani, a former associate of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Al-
Qahtani had been leading an organized effort aimed at distorting the information environment
to the benefit of the Saudi regime (Leber and Abrahams, 2019). Nicknamed the “Lord of the
Flies” in reference to his army of “electronic flies”—paid trolls who persistently attacked online
critics—he was also implicated in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 (Benner
et al., 2018; b33lz3bub, 2019; Ignatius, 2018). In November 2019, the US Justice Department
then charged two former Twitter employees with spying for the Saudi state after they shared
the personal data of online critics.
This series of revelations led some to speculate that Twitter has become “more useful
to the repressors than the repressed” in countries like Saudi Arabia (Post, 2019). Given the
brutality of the Saudi regime offline, its history of repressing online critics (Pan and Siegel,
2020), and the apparent extent of its reach online, this conclusion is understandable. However,
we lack empirical evidence regarding the scale of these domestically deployed influence oper-
ations. In this article, we quantify domestic engagement with online influence operations in
Saudi Arabia. Our goal is to contribute to recent efforts aimed at providing descriptive analysis
of the scale of online disinformation (Allen et al., 2020; Allcott et al., 2019).
We employ multiple descriptive strategies to gauge the extent of these operations and
any traces of their influence on individual users. We draw on five datasets of tweets including
tweets from IO accounts, tweets produced by a random sample of Saudi users, tweets from ge-
olocated Saudi users, tweets from fifteen major Saudi news organizations, and tweets produced
by the fifty most followed users in Saudi Arabia. We benchmark observed engagement with IO
tweets against engagement with our samples of ordinary Saudi Twitter users and high-profile
Saudi accounts. We then estimate network positions of IO users and estimate their influence
by analyzing mentions of IO accounts over time.
Overall, we find that although domestic engagement with IO tweets was approximately
1Twitter refers to these as “information operations”; we refer in what follows to “influence operations,”
which is the more common designation in the literature.
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equal to engagement with the top fifteen Saudi news outlets, it was markedly lower than
engagement with tweets in our representative samples, and dramatically lower than engagement
with the fifty most influential accounts in the Saudi Twittersphere. Engagement with IO
accounts was also relatively lower on controversial topics such as the murder of Khashoggi, the
Qatar crisis, and other foreign and domestic political topics. In our representative samples of
Saudi Twitter users, IO accounts were mentioned in ∼.05–.10% of all tweets, and in ∼.25–.50 %
of all mentions. Our network analysis suggests that engagement with IO accounts was largely
driven by engagement with a few prominent accounts. The vast majority of IO accounts saw
very little engagement during the period under study.
Quantifying Online Influence Operations
Online disinformation encompasses a broad range of activities including fake news websites,
hired and independent trolls, hyper-partisan news media, and online influence efforts (Siegel,
2018). We focus on state-backed inluence operations as a distinct sub-type of online disinforma-
tion. We adopt the definition of Martin et al. (2020) for domestic online influence and influence
operations as “coordinated campaigns by a state to impact one or more specific aspects of do-
mestic politics, through media channels, including social media, by producing content designed
to appear as though it is produced by normal users.” The term “influence operation” might
imply a specific political goal while “information operation” better captures the broader goal
of distorting the online information environment. Both terms have been used interchangeably
in the literature, we opt for the catch-all “IO” when referring to this activity.
Existing research into online IO campaigns takes the IO as the unit of analysis, find-
ing that since at least 2011, online “influence operations,” “information operations” or forms of
“computational propaganda” have been steadily increasing (Bradshaw and Howard, 2018, 2019;
Martin et al., 2019, 2020). Here, Russia, stands out as a key sponsor of IO activity, alongside
China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (Martin et al., 2020). Twitter and Facebook remain
the principal platforms for the dissemination of IO content, and there is evidence that states
are increasingly reliant on out-sourcing IO campaigns to ostensibly independent media compa-
nies (Martin et al., 2020; Bradshaw and Howard, 2019). These cross-national reviews provide
valuable information on the extent and nature of IO activity as a phenomenon but are silent
on the scale of IO activity relative to total content on a given platform in each country.
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Other research investigates the effect of IO activity or ”fake news” outside the country
of origin.2 Some have argued that consumption of false or malicious information affected
voting outcomes in both the US and UK (Gorodnichenko et al., 2018; Gunther et al., 2019).
However, a growing body of research has found reason to be skeptical of these conclusions. A
first cause for skepticism is that engagement with false or unreliable information promoted by
coordinated IO campaigns may not actually affect behaviour or attitudes (Guess et al., 2020;
Bail et al., 2020). The second cause for skepticism is that fake news often represents only a tiny
proportion of overall information consumption (Guess et al., 2019; Allen et al., 2020). To date,
the overwhelming majority of empirical work investigating these questions has focused on the
US and foreign IO campaigns—a limitation acknowledged by these authors (Bail et al., 2020).
Whether or not IO campaigns work differently when deployed domestically therefore remains
an open empirical question.
A final body of work that does investigate domestically deployed IO campaigns focuses
specifically on China. A key finding is that the objective of IOs inside China’s “Great Firewall”
is, more than anything, to distort the online information environment through sheer volume
(King et al., 2017; Roberts, 2018). It is worth noting, however, that findings from China
may be unlikely to generalize to other authoritarian contexts given that China’s ability to
shape domestic social media is—at least in part—a function of the dominance of domestic
firms in China’s market for Internet content (Pan, 2017). Limited information is available
on the scale of IOs in other settings.3 As such, we also do not know whether IOs outside of
such high-capacity regimes can effectively distort the information environment—particularly
on mainstream, rather than state owned, social media platforms.
In sum, we know that IO activity has been increasing worldwide. Foreign-backed op-
erations may have had limited success in affecting political outcomes or attitudes in target
countries. When deployed by high-capacity regimes domestically, these information campaigns
have, however, been successful in distorting the online information environment. Descriptive
information on the extent and potential influence of these operations outside these contexts
remains lacking. A move towards providing descriptive information on these forms of commu-
2Fake news is a phenomenon distinct from IO activity, but IO campaigns have also participated in
the dissemination of fake news (Badawy et al., 2019; Martin et al., 2020).
3For an exception see Alizadeh et al. 2020. For descriptive details of IO tweet content attributed to
Iran see Elswah et al. (2019).
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nication is therefore critical if we are to understand their likely influence.
To that end, we take inspiration from recent research quantifying the likelihood of
exposure to false, misleading or actively malicious forms of information (Allen et al., 2020;
Guess et al., 2019). These initiatives are crucial: without descriptive information on the actual
scale of particular forms of online information, we can only conjecture about their potential
effects. In what follows, we quantify the extent of engagement with influence operations in
Saudi Arabia—a country that has made headlines for its use of computational propaganda in
the pursuit of domestic political aims.
Influence Operations in Saudi Arabia
Over the past several years, the Saudi regime has poured increasing resources into influence
operations aimed at promoting the Kingdom’s strategic goals domestically and abroad. Re-
searchers have identified evidence of Saudi Arabia using computational propaganda to spread
pro-government messages and discredit opposition since 2013 (Woolley, 2016). Domestically,
Saudi influence operations have engaged in a variety of tactics from spreading sectarian hate
speech to promoting content praising Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and his social
reform plan, Vision 2030 (Jones, 2016; Pfeiffer, 2019).
These operations include the use of automated bots and paid trolls alike. Research on
bot use in Saudi Arabia finds that automated content creation of this kind was used to promote
anti-Qatar hashtags during and after the 2017 Gulf Crisis (Jones, 2019), even if the volume of
automated online content creation was likely only limited (Abrahams and Leber, 2020). Some
such accounts have been linked to Smaat, a social media and marketing firm based in Saudi
Arabia, that has managed the accounts of many high-profile Saudis as well as official accounts
for some government departments (Grossman et al., 2020b). Inauthentic accounts have been
found to engage in a variety of activities from harassing activists or opposition figures to
flooding the Saudi Twittersphere with diversionary trending hashtags (al Sharif, 2019; DiResta
et al., 2019). Saudi influence campaigns abroad, in particular their efforts to shape global
opinion after the Khashoggi murder and the Qatar Crisis, have received a reasonable share of
journalistic and scholarly attention (Grossman et al., 2020b; Jones, 2019). In comparison, we
know relatively little about the size of domestic influence operations in the Saudi Twittersphere.
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Data & Method
Our principal data source is a set of IO tweets originating in Saudi Arabia over 2019. These
data were released publicly by the Twitter Transparency Center, and provided “unhashed”—in
a format that does not redact the names of users with fewer than 5,000 followers—to aca-
demic researchers. We obtained the unhashed versions of the releases for December 2019 and
April 2020.4 Twitter attributes the accounts released in December 2019 to Smaat, the Saudi
marketing firm, stating “Rigorous investigations by our Site Integrity team have allowed us to
attribute these accounts to a significant state-backed information operation on Twitter origi-
nating in Saudi Arabia...Our investigations have traced the source of the coordinated activity
to Smaat, a social media marketing and management company based in Saudi Arabia. Our
in-house technical indicators show that Smaat appears to have created, purchased, and/or man-
aged these accounts...Smaat managed a range of Twitter accounts for high-profile individuals,
as well as many government departments in Saudi Arabia.” The second of these releases is
described by Twitter as “A network of accounts associated with Saudi Arabia and operating
out of multiple countries including KSA, Egypt and UAE.”
While it can often be difficult to ascertain the origins of IO activities, Twitter’s in-
vestigations suggests that these accounts were indeed coordinated from within Saudi Arabia.
Twitter’s descriptions of the activities of these accounts suggest that they were engaged in
a combination of activities amplifying messages in line with Saudi domestic and geopolitical
interests—including a small amount of English language content. This suggests that these
were likely aimed at Saudi citizens, regional audiences, and—to a much lesser degree—Western
audiences.
Because we are interested in tracking the domestic activity of these accounts, we man-
ually filtered the second release to retain only users for whom "user_reported_location"
referenced a location within Saudi Arabia. After restricting our tweets to the year 2019, we end
up with a combined sample of ∼9.8m IO tweets and ∼4.5k unique accounts. In the Appendix,
we provide descriptive statistics on each release, including information on the proportion of
tweets that included user reported locations.
4See https://tinyurl.com/twitIODec19 and https://tinyurl.com/twitIOApr20 for the blog post write-
ups supplied by Twitter for each release. Last accessed: 09 Nov, 2020.
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In order to gauge the scale and influence of IO content in the Saudi Twittersphere,
we compare these tweets with four other datasets of tweets originating from Saudi Arabia.
The first two are random samples of Saudi users’ tweets obtained using two different sampling
techniques. The second two are 2019 tweets from the top fifty most followed accounts in Saudi
Arabia and the top fifteen most-followed news sources.5 For ease of communication we refer
to each of our datasets using a shortened title: IO = Influence Operations tweets; SA =
1% Saudi user sample; GEO = Geo-located Saudi user sample; TOP = top fifty Saudi user
tweets; NEWS = top fifteen Saudi news organization tweets. We describe how each of these
was collected below.
Our first sampling method was designed to get a random sample of Saudi Twitter
users. We streamed tweets from the public Twitter POST statuses/filter API endpoint. For
this, we used the “tweepy” Python library (Roesslein, 2020) and filtered tweets with bounding
box coordinates for Saudi Arabia. After ingesting an initial set of tweets, we filtered users
by country code, restricting our user set to users located to Saudi Arabia. We then used
the GET statuses/user_timeline API endpoint via the R package “rtweet” (Kearney et al.,
2020) to obtain the last 3,200 tweets of each of the 10,400 Twitter users in our sample. The
resulting SA sample contains ∼4.7m tweets. While the vast majority of tweets in this dataset
are produced by everyday Saudi Twitter users, manually coding the top 100 most followed
users in this sample suggests that this sample also includes social media influencers, football
accounts, government accounts, entrepreneurs, and clerics. The top 100 most followed accounts
in this sample are displayed in Table A7.
Our second approach used Twitter’s Streaming API to collect tweets that had been
geolocated to within the borders of Saudi Arabia in early 2019.6 The advantage of this second
technique is that tweets were collected in real time. This means that we also capture any
tweets engaging with IO accounts that users might have later chosen to delete after the public
disclosure of their IO origin. The Streaming API captures tweets within a large bounding-box
that crosses into non-Saudi territory. We therefore first filtered our sample to users located
within the borders of Saudi Arabia. We plot the location of our GEO users in Figure 1. Like
5Information on the top fifty most followed accounts was obtained from social media analytics com-
pany ”Socialbakers.” See: https://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/twitter/profiles/saudi-arabia.
6This data was collected at NYU’s Social Media and Political Participation (SMaPP) lab.
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the random sample of Saudi Twitter users, while this dataset mostly consists of tweets pro-
duced by regular Saudi Twitter users, the most followed accounts include influencers, football
accounts, government accounts, and entrepreneurs. This dataset also includes a number of en-
tertainment accounts (artists, musicians, comedians etc.), some of whom visited Saudi Arabia
for performances. The top 100 most followed accounts in this sample are displayed in Table
A8. After collecting these tweets, we obtained the 3200 most recent tweets for the unique users
that appeared in our sample. This gave us a final dataset of ∼11.3m GEO tweets over the year
2019 (of which ∼367k from live stream).
In addition to these sampling techniques, we also used the Historical Power Track API
to collect all tweets over the year 2019 for the fifty most followed accounts generally and
fifteen most-followed accounts of Saudi news organizations. The first of these includes ∼145k
tweets; the second ∼449k tweets. This gives us two samples of high-profile accounts—TOP
and NEWS—against which to further benchmark engagement with IO accounts. These users
are displayed in Tables A9 and A10.
A note on sampling techniques is worthwhile at this stage. Recent research on the
Twitter sampling API reveals that it is vulnerable to artificial distortion and may not represent
an actual 1% random sample (Morstatter et al., 2013; Pfeffer et al., 2018). While this type
of distortion may be a vulnerability during periods of intense use—e.g., during elections—we
do not expect that it threatens the representativeness of our sample. By using two separate
sampling techniques we are also able to compare our two samples of Saudi user tweets to each
other to check for any obvious dissimilarities.7
The account language provided by Twitter for the IO tweets was 92% Arabic. For our
other datasets, we did not capture the Twitter account language upon first ingest. To overcome
this, we manually coded a random sample of 200 tweets from each sample for whether they
contained Arabic text (see Table A6). The majority language in each dataset is Arabic. Our
GEO tweet sample contains the smallest percentage of Arabic tweets at 73%. The SA tweets
are 89% Arabic; NEWS tweets are 99.5% Arabic; TOP tweets are 86% Arabic. The relatively
7Given that our GEO random sample was collected after IO accounts had been removed, we can also
be sure that there is no crossover in users. We also checked whether any IO accounts appeared in our
tweets collected with the streaming API (before the IO account removal) and we found no crossover.
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Figure 1. Coordinate locations of GEO-identified Saudi users.
Note. N= 367,000.
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lower percentage of Arabic tweets in our GEO sample suggests that our SA sample may be
more reliably capturing users normally resident in Saudi Arabia. In contrast, our GEO sample
may be capturing some individuals in transit through Saudi Arabia or only temporarily in the
country.
Figure 2. IO tweets attributed to Saudi state-backed operations.
Note. N = 33,740,460, includes only accounts active in 2019. Shaded area indicates
observation period for the analyses below.
We focus our analysis on 2019, which was the year that saw the highest overall incidence
of IO tweets in the public Twitter release (see Figure 2). It is also the year for which we were
able to obtain a reliable live-collected sample of Saudi users. Using a more proximate time
period also meant that we could retrospectively obtain a second random sample of Twitter
users without having to bypass the limit of 3,200 historic tweets permitted by Twitter ToS.
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We first measure engagement by calculating the observed number of retweets for IO
tweets.8 We repeat this for a subsample of tweets mentioning a range of political topics,
including those tweets that mention ”Jamal Khashoggi” or ”Qatar”—two polarizing topics
that were particularly prevalent in the more actively political content disseminated by IO
accounts (DiResta et al., 2019). The motivation for carrying out this analysis is that, while
overall engagement with IO accounts may be low, they may receive outsized attention for
their dissemination of false or malicious information. This would be consistent with previous
published findings that false news stories diffuse more rapidly than verifiable news stories
(Vosoughi et al., 2018). We then benchmark observed engagement against our two random
samples and two samples of news and high-profile users.
Using mentions of IO accounts within our random samples as a measure of influence,
we then estimate for our random samples of Saudi users the percentage of total mentions, and
percentage of total tweets, that include an IO account. Finally, we locate influential IO users
within overall mention networks for all of our samples combined.
Results
We display density plots of observed engagement (retweets) in our IO accounts alongside our
reference samples in Figure 3. The width of the density curve corresponds to the relative
frequency of observations at given regions on the y-axis. Given the size of these datsets, we
choose to display a random subsample of 10,000 observations for each tweet sample.
We see that while retweets of IO accounts are approximately equivalent to retweets of
major Saudi news outlets, retweet volume is markedly higher in our SA and GEO samples
when compared to the IO accounts. As expected, our TOP accounts receive substantially
more retweets. We then subset our samples, filtering tweets to include only those that mention
Khashoggi or Qatar. These represent more contentious topics, and so we may expect to see
heightened engagement.
8We were unable to recover accurate estimates of favorites for our SA and GEO benchmark samples.
This was due to a change in the Twitter endpoint, which meant the ”rtweet” package failed to recover
favorite counts. In any case, retweets and favorites tend to correlate relatively highly, meaning we would
unlikely reach different conclusions due to this omission. Retweeting is also, arguably, a surer measure
of engagement than liking.
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Figure 3. Retweets of IO accounts and four benchmark samples.
Note. Kernel density scatter plots with overlaid boxplots showing median, first, and third
quartiles of distribution.
We see in Figures 4a and 4b that tweets mentioning these subjects do see substantially
more engagement, but the increase in engagement is far more pronounced in the SA and GEO
samples than it is in the IO accounts. That is, when it comes to contentious political subjects,
IO accounts invited far less engagement than the average Saudi user. In the Appendix, we
verify that this finding is not attributable to our choice of topics. One concern is that these
topics might be more aimed at regional than domestic audiences, which could explain the lower
engagement we observe. In place of Khashoggi and Qatar topics, we instead analyze subsets of
tweets based on whether they include a politically-relevant hashtag. We do so by taking the top
hashtags used by the NEWS tweet accounts, and manually code those hashtags that pertain
to domestic or foreign political themes.9 We then group these into two categories that relate
to domestic political and foreign political topics, as well as three further categories relating to
Iran, Yemen, and the Saudi Royal family specifically. We list the hashtags and their assigned
categories in Table A11. Across all five groups of tweets, we see that SA and GEO tweets
see far higher engagement than IO tweets, and as much, if not more, engagement, than TOP
accounts. Again, NEWS accounts see relatively muted engagement irrespective of topic. We
9We defined top hashtags as those that appeared with frequency >500 in the NEWS tweets. In total,
we coded 145 hashtags for relevance to different political topics.
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(a) Tweets mentioning “Khashoggi” in IO accounts and four benchmark samples.
(b) Tweets mentioning ”Qatar” in IO accounts and four benchmark samples.
Figure 4. Tweets mentioning political topics.
Note. Kernel density scatter plots with overlaid boxplots showing median, first, and third
quartiles of distribution.
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display these findings in Figure A1.
Providing suggestive evidence beyond Twitter’s investigations that the Saudi IO ac-
counts are likely intentionally targeting a domestic audience—in addition to a foreign one—we
see that IO accounts tweet about domestic topics (including discussions of specific royal family
members, the economy, the education system and the justice system) at about the same rate
that they tweet about the Qatar crisis—the most discussed geopolitical event in our dataset.
We display the distributions of these topics in our data in Figure A3.
Mentions of IO accounts provide us with another measure of their influence. If a user
within our other random samples mentions an IO user, this is indication that IO activity has
managed to penetrate the online discussion. We calculate for both our SA and GEO samples of
Saudi Twitter users the percentage of overall mentions and overall tweets that include mention
of an IO user. We display these as daily means, seven-day rolling means, and overall means in
Figures 5a and 5b.10
We see that, for our SA sample, no more than .09% on average of overall tweets contain
mention of an IO accounts, and for our GEO sample, no more than .05%. As a percentage
of overall mentions, this quantity is .4% and .27% respectively for the two samples. We also
see from our two samples of Saudi Twitter users, however, that a relatively high percentage of
users interacted with (mentioned) an IO account at least once. In the SA sample, 17.9% of
users mentioned an IO account; in the GEO sample 9.6% of users mentioned an IO account.
These proportions are comparable to available estimates of US users’ interactions with Russian
Internet Research Agency accounts, where 11.3% of users directly interacted with these troll
accounts (Bail et al., 2020).
In the article by Bail et al. (2020), the sample of US users included only politically
engaged users. Conversely, our sample is blind to users’ political engagement. The elevated
levels of interaction we see in our Saudi users sample may therefore be surprising. However,
it is worth bearing in mind that the IO accounts did not just tweet political content. In
fact, many tweeted an abundance of commercial and religious content (DiResta et al., 2019;
Grossman et al., 2020a). As a check on this, we subset our SA and GEO sample users by
10See Table A12 for a list of the top mentioned IO accounts across all of our samples.
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(a) Percentage of tweets that include mention of an IO account, SA and GEO
samples.
(b) Percentage of mentions that include mention of an IO account, SA and GEO
samples.
Figure 5. Percentage of tweets and mentions mentioning an IO account.
Note. Grey lines represent daily mean percentages; colored lines seven-day rolling means,
and dashed horizontal lines overall means.
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their volume of political posting. We identify the top 25% most “political” users in our SA
and GEO samples by subsetting out those users who post most frequently with politically
relevant hashtags taken from our NEWS sample. Here, we use all hashtags that coded as 1
for either domestic or foreign political relevance. We see that engagement with IO accounts
among these users is slightly more pronounced: .1% of tweets mention an IO account among
these users in the SA sample, and .08% of tweets in the GEO sample; while .55% and .50% of
all mentions include an IO account in the SA and GEO samples respectively.11 Nonetheless,
overall levels of interaction with IO accounts remains muted. It is worth noting, too, that GEO
accounts posted about political topics (used politically-relevant hashtags) with less frequency
than our SA accounts (.60% versus .97%). One interpretation of this is that those individuals
who do not take the precaution of disabling geolocation are also likely less disposed to talking
about potentially sensitive political topics in public. This provides suggestive lessons about
appropriate sampling techniques when analyzing repressive contexts. A second interpretation
is that our GEO sample captures different types of users, some of whom are not normally
resident in Saudi Arabia, as suggested by the relatively lower percentage of Arabic-language
tweets in this sample.12
These elevated engagement levels also seem to be driven largely by a small number of
influential accounts. We therefore determine which IO users received most mentions in each
of our samples. Combining information on IO mentions across all of our samples, we then
locate the position of influential IO accounts within an overall mention network. The network
visualization in Figure 6 displays the mention network of the combined SA, GEO, and TOP
samples.13 Here, nodes are sized by in-degree and represent IO users that are mentioned in any
of our three samples of Saudi Twitter users. We also color sets of nodes and edges by modularity
score, following the community-detection technique proposed by Blondel et al. (2008). We see
that the mention network is dominated by a small number of IO users. Manually coding the
users who most frequently mention IO accounts, we see that most of the engagement comes from
regular Saudi Twitter users with relatively low numbers of followers, rather than influencers or
11For the bottom 25% of users by frequency of posting with political hashtags, the percentages were
.063% and .034% of all tweets, and .26% and .17% of all mentions for the SA and GEO samples
respectively.
12Our GEO and SA samples are nonetheless essentially identical in terms of follower count and daily
tweet frequency (see Figure A2).
13We do not include NEWS accounts here as these accounts mentioned zero IO accounts.
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popular figures.14
Figure 6. Network visualization of mentioned IO accounts.
Note. Nodes sized by in-degree and colored by cluster.
14Grossman et al. (2020a) note that one tactic used by Smaat—the organization subcontracted to
conduct the Saudi IO campaign—was to target online influencers in an attempt to amplify their influence.
Our analysis here suggests that this strategy was largely unsuccessful.
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Discussion and Conclusion
The absence of descriptive information on the scale of different forms of information exposure is
a central problem in the communications literature. There are several dimensions to this issue.
First, information is consumed across multiple platforms, meaning that even if inaccurate
or malicious forms of information proliferate on one medium, it may yet constitute a small
proportion of overall information diets when assessed across multiple media—at the level of the
“information ecosystem” (Allen et al., 2020). Second, we lack good measures of human attention
on the Internet (Lazer, 2020), meaning that we do not know whether and how individuals
actually engage with particular forms of information. Third, much of the information shared
online remains proprietary, inaccessible to the public, and subject to unpredictable changes
in terms of use (Freelon, 2018; Pasquetto et al., 2020). The ostensibly straightforward task
of estimating the share of online misinformation as a proportion of overall content therefore
remains difficult.
In this article, we solve some of these issues, while others remain open. Our findings
are—first and foremost—limited to domestic engagement with known IO content on Twitter.
We are constrained to analyzing engagement with known IO accounts that have been made
publicly available. But it is of course possible that there is other IO activity in the Saudi Twit-
tersphere during this period that we are not able to observe. Moreover, while understanding
domestic engagement with these accounts is undoubtedly important, Twitter’s investigations
suggest these accounts likely target individuals both within and beyond the borders of Saudi
Arabia.
More generally, our results are also limited to Twitter. Given that Twitter is so widely
used in Saudi Arabia, conclusions that pertain solely to this platform are still relevant. But we
know that other state-backed media remains more popular overall, in particular among older
generations (Everette et al., 2019), even if younger Saudis are consuming the large majority
of their news on social media (Shikaki, 2020). Given the popularity of social media for news
consumption, the relatively muted engagement we see with news organizations might be taken
as indication that online mainstream news media is not particularly influential.
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However, there is reason to question such an interpretation. When measured as likes
or retweets, engagement may not be immediately comparable between different account types.
This issue is most stark for news accounts, which tweet frequently, often with links to articles
hosted on the relevant organization’s website. These accounts nonetheless receive often only
limited engagement in the form of likes and retweets (Ackland et al., 2019). Part of the reason
for this may be that news organizations are unlikely to engage in conversation or reciprocate
another user’s engagement. But given the absence of alternative measures of human attention,
we remain reliant on standard engagement criteria.
Despite these limitations, by utilizing multiple sampling strategies and benchmarking
IO content against relevant country-level samples, we are nonetheless able to provide system-
atic measures of domestic engagement with known influence campaigns in Saudi Arabia. The
Twitter API remains relatively open, and by using the Streaming API to collect data in real
time we are able to get a clearer picture of the overall platform-level information environment
and catch any IO influence on Saudi users before content removal.
Taken together, our analysis suggests that although domestic engagement with IO
tweets was approximately equal to engagement with the top fifteen Saudi news outlets, it was
significantly lower than engagement with tweets in our representative samples, and dramati-
cally lower than engagement with the fifty most influential accounts in the Saudi Twittersphere.
These findings complement existing research into misinformation originating from Saudi Ara-
bia. Abrahams and Leber (2020), for example, find evidence of bot activity in Saudi Arabia
promoting pro-regime messaging, but conclude that even for contentious political topics, the
volume of such content was generally low. Engagement with IO account tweets in our analyses
was also relatively low. Compared to engagement with general Saudi user tweets, engagement
with IO content on controversial topics such as the murder of Khashoggi or the Qatar crisis was
muted. And this finding is consistent across a diverse range of political topics. Our network
analysis indicates that engagement with IO accounts was largely driven by engagement with a
few prominent accounts, with the vast majority of IO accounts receiving very little engagement
during the period under study.
We hope that future research will continue to descriptively map engagement with influ-
ence operations in diverse contexts and across multiple platforms. Quantifying basic levels of
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engagement is a first step in understanding the importance of rapidly evolving computational
propaganda campaigns world-wide.
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We use two releases of IO tweets from the unhashed datasets provided by Twitter Trans-
parency Center in December, 2019 and April, 2020. The first of these datasets , detailed in
Table A.1, contained only tweets identified as originating from Saudi state-backed IO activity.
Because all of these tweets were attributed to Saudi Arabia, we do not filter these tweets by
"user_reported_location". Unfortunately, Twitter does not provide details on how these
tweets were ultimately attributed to Saudi state-backed IO activity. In the main analyses,
we decide to retain all tweets from this release, irrespective of user-reported location, given
that they were attributed to Saudi state-backed activity by Twitter. In Table A.2 we provide
descriptive statistics for the sample used in the main analyses: tweets in 2019. Here, we see
that ∼6.5m tweets had some location information (61%). The N of tweets from this release
included in the final IO analysis sample is bolded in red.
Table A.1: IO tweets Release 1: full date-range provided in data release.





saudi_arabia_112019 32054257 18840595 58.78
Table A.2: IO tweets Release 1: tweets in 2019.








The second IO release was in April, 2020. These tweets came bundled with tweets
attributed to state-backed Information Operations in Egypt and the UAE. We therefore filtered
these tweets by user-reported location to obtain a sample of tweets for Saudi Arabia. We
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present aggregate statistics for this sample in Table A.3 below. Of the ∼36.5m tweets, ∼19.3m
included user-reported locations (53%), and of the reported locations, ∼9.9m were in Saudi
Arabia (27%). In Table A.4 we provide descriptive statistics for the sample used in the main
analyses: tweets in 2019. Here, we see that ∼7.6m tweets had some location information (48%),
and of the reported locations ∼3.4m were in Saudi Arabia. The N of tweets from this release
included in the final IO analysis sample is bolded in red.
Table A.3: IO tweets Release 2: full date-range provided in data release.











sa_eg_ae_022020 36523980 19344502 9924380 52.96 51.3
Table A.4: IO tweets Release 2: tweets in 2019.













15769043 7616583 3370759 48.3 21.38
Finally, in Table A.5 we the total N of tweets after combining the two sets of tweets
for 2019 from both releases. Note: the total N of tweets after combining the two datasets is
slightly less than the sum of the two sets of tweets for 2019 in Saudi Arabia displayed in Tables
A.2 and A.4 (i.e., 6456312 + 3370759) because there was some tweet IDs that appeared in both
datasets. These duplicates were therefore removed for the final analysis.
Table A.5: IO tweets analysis sample: all tweets in 2019 combined.
IO dataset # tweets # accounts




Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media 1(2021) Kingdom of Trolls? A3
Table A.6: Percentage Arabic language tweets by tweet dataset.
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Table A.7: 100 Most Followed Users in SA Sample
rank screen_name followers_count type
1 Talhabeeb 6668550.00 influencer
2 _m4nb_ 547382.00 influencer
3 Fahad_Alotaibi_ 508620.00 football
4 AhmedJallalah 452684.00 business
5 Saif_Hamoh 409020.00 media
6 dr_alimalki 387835.00 cleric
7 1binkasem 276961.00 influencer
8 moh_Altwaijri 241763.00 sports
9 imede_ 162196.00 influencer
10 tourismpictures 123285.00 entertainment
11 1Wether 121325.00 weather
12 Abdulahalsalemm 104618.00 journalist
13 Turki_binFaisal 104508.00 government
14 m_albryk 103209.00 entertainment
15 azoz6670 98474.00 football
16 Riyadh_mmm 91489.00 business
17 mrj112 86007.00 influencer
18 AL_HJARI 83228.00 influencer
19 B_swed 82968.00 influencer
20 Y_senan 80997.00 entertainment
21 azizooghali 75920.00 sports
22 bahaforest 75627.00 influencer
23 swsynbd 74909.00 football
24 ahmed_alabdallh 74294.00 government
25 meteb_alnofay 73834.00 influencer
26 OmarExplains 72473.00 entertainment
27 snap_tabuk 71631.00 media
28 abdoh4magic 70772.00 entertainment
29 IIabraj 64637.00 entertainment
30 BahaUniversity 63168.00 university
31 hamadGR 62302.00 influencer
32 bader2992 61698.00 influencer
33 Hamad_L77 60261.00 influencer
34 Moh1Rz2H3 59734.00 influencer
35 su_subit 58460.00 cleric
36 alqassimwater 58365.00 business
37 iiSultt 55103.00 influencer
38 AsirTourism 53991.00 business
39 i____300 53938.00 influencer
40 hash_salman__ 53045.00 government
41 Arafatbinhassan 52507.00 cleric
42 majidr99 49896.00 football
43 AliAlmeshaal 48794.00 influencer
44 Mkhnews 47970.00 media
45 DrKhalidAloudah 46990.00 business
46 OmarAlwhibi 46495.00 influencer
47 Manafa_co 44117.00 business
48 aiydhalqhtani 42557.00 sports
49 Brand_Gifts1 41512.00 business
50 MOE_ONZ 40413.00 government
51 AlObayyd 39989.00 influencer
52 WaleedMuath 38540.00 influencer
53 OMAR____911 38235.00 influencer
54 ahmadanaji 37328.00 influencer
55 gunfdhnet 34461.00 media
56 ayalyami 34450.00 media
57 AliAlmohsen1 33795.00 influencer
58 majed_otayf 33182.00 media
59 s3dzxx 33143.00 influencer
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60 zalfadah1408 32643.00 influencer
61 hamood_9h 32526.00 influencer
62 _5LiD_ 32438.00 influencer
63 A_Alrasheed5 32200.00 influencer
64 aa5sdfg802 32085.00 influencer
65 jubailnow 31597.00 media
66 WaIeedGH 31052.00 sports
67 TasiPro 30887.00 business
68 FaisalALa7mari 30511.00 entertainment
69 aalsanie 30509.00 business
70 yanbu__news 30249.00 media
71 ALHarbi_seif 30060.00 influencer
72 alkhamisziad 29717.00 academic
73 alshnaif 29293.00 media
74 khobar_history 28659.00 media
75 RBahais 28509.00 business
76 na7da7n 28021.00 influencer
77 mycruiseksa 27908.00 business
78 DrAlashgar 27814.00 business
79 azmrsh 26808.00 entertainment
80 MajidSociety 26527.00 business
81 MajedAlFahad 26069.00 influencer
82 3z_w1 26009.00 influencer
83 Azizooo1 25982.00 cleric
84 Enfahadd 25872.00 influencer
85 Artisana_Decor 25791.00 business
86 saleh_br 25586.00 influencer
87 k1k21 25021.00 influencer
88 AloniniYb 24824.00 influencer
89 alknfri8 24799.00 entertainment
90 jameel_hazzazi 24745.00 suspended
91 rahla22 24653.00 influencer
92 fu__82 24214.00 sports
93 asg1391h 23955.00 influencer
94 fawwazalhrbi 23818.00 influencer
95 yutm_511 23569.00 influencer
96 alashiri747 23340.00 influencer
97 __hm78 23182.00 business
98 malaysiatravel1 23031.00 business
99 alshehri_dr 22760.00 business
100 burydahprojects 22628.00 business
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Table A.8: 100 Most Followed Users in GEO Sample
rank screen_name followers_count type
1 FrencHMonTanA 2956783.00 entertainment
2 melly_goeslaw 2326600.00 entertainment
3 PeterPsquare 1847002.00 entertainment
4 AnisaRahma_Adi 1272228.00 entertainment
5 Almoj_alazra8 966210.00 football
6 faizalfbi76 671525.00 entertainment
7 emma_maembong 630200.00 entertainment
8 HamadAlMuneef 536749.00 government
9 bourashed 534029.00 media
10 salimafillah 528097.00 entertainment
11 NAmrabat53 517448.00 football
12 khalid88990 513100.00 football
13 mjeedalfawzan 471353.00 entertainment
14 mq8y 446310.00 influencer
15 datoacmizal 417949.00 entertainment
16 nahlah_aljammal 388198.00 journalist
17 ka3am_al3ayel 376709.00 entertainment
18 HaqueMarissa 375918.00 entertainment
19 jeddahnews_ 369562.00 media
20 rohara_group 332886.00 business
21 _tu00 320112.00 suspended
22 MoaSalem 318990.00 entertainment
23 mainohustlehard 317475.00 entertainment
24 5o__51 305668.00 influencer
25 DA2_Ridho 297461.00 entertainment
26 DA2_Rizki 293574.00 entertainment
27 yasser_madkhli 291085.00 entertainment
28 Hafez_AlMedlej 280293.00 football
29 O__vip 277818.00 influencer
30 Mhzh_ 261793.00 football
31 moh_Altwaijri 258195.00 sports
32 Ai9i9i 251851.00 influencer
33 fi9_z 246577.00 media
34 qap_1 245207.00 influencer
35 99t 243429.00 influencer
36 ab_raddadi 229705.00 entertainment
37 Ruleyork 229155.00 entertainment
38 beautyouamal 229004.00 influencer
39 Ahmadbinnaqi 229002.00 suspended
40 farooi 213172.00 business
41 mltqa_al3nzh 209435.00 suspended
42 Sami_Alhomood 207970.00 cleric
43 alzhirri 203013.00 entertainment
44 TMFaisalx 196044.00 influencer
45 md_almousa 188310.00 entertainment
46 MoustafaELFarra 186430.00 influencer
47 alromansiahKSA 182856.00 business
48 hemsh8 179713.00 entertainment
49 laylaiskandar 175717.00 entertainment
50 3zizez 171817.00 influencer
51 ArwaHomaidan 169893.00 entertainment
52 tdrebnews 160606.00 media
53 Sharqiya_event 160379.00 entertainment
54 Ss_m_f 159563.00 suspended
55 KSA_A52 152717.00 suspended
56 WonhoChung 150202.00 entertainment
57 HatoonKadi 149854.00 entertainment
58 AliKuemkh 148277.00 football
59 _x19_ 147959.00 influencer
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60 H____60 143811.00 suspended
61 _467__ 139397.00 suspended
62 joshua00966 137874.00 suspended
63 Abualfawarss123 137866.00 media
64 souza5 137373.00 football
65 kupinang 136010.00 entertainment
66 ShougAA6 133265.00 influencer
67 Nada_Fadel 132922.00 business
68 FHAD_M_305 127811.00 entertainment
69 MFMiraFilzah 124719.00 entertainment
70 BassemCHRISTO 122404.00 entertainment
71 JeddahChamber 121225.00 government
72 MajeedAlrhedi 120798.00 entertainment
73 Jfurlanich 120400.00 journalist
74 s7sn_ 117439.00 influencer
75 aljubailtoday1 116337.00 media
76 sz_v27 112689.00 influencer
77 triggar6 111393.00 influencer
78 mkki1982 107393.00 suspended
79 snake_toe 106736.00 influencer
80 rahneputri 106082.00 influencer
81 nabilhdad 104708.00 suspended
82 SultanQhtani 102822.00 media
83 abb_hf 102616.00 influencer
84 NIZARAALGHANNAM 100776.00 suspended
85 3_1i 100278.00 influencer
86 TurkiAlmohsen 100080.00 influencer
87 F_abarh 99910.00 suspended
88 ZulAbrarHakim 98867.00 influencer
89 abualmshx 98087.00 suspended
90 abdullahacbadem 97533.00 government
91 sredusa 97523.00 university
92 ABUALMSH 97067.00 suspended
93 Cydiagold 96437.00 suspended
94 Msdossary7 95900.00 football
95 Ahoud40009 95564.00 business
96 abualmsh 94776.00 suspended
97 DrFahad55 92732.00 business
98 alaqsaclinics 92227.00 business
99 ALM3TA9M 91390.00 influencer
100 Mabkhot_b13 91306.00 suspended
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7 Alwaleed_Talal royal family
8 HashKSA aggregator
9 Alhilal_FC football





























39 faisalbinturki1 royal family
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Table A.11: Politically-relevant hashtags and codings from NEWS accounts.
rank frequency translated hashtag domestic political foreign political iran yemen royal
1 6813 #iran 0 1 1 0 0
2 6424 #yemen 0 1 0 1 0
3 4769 #crown_prince 1 0 0 0 1
4 3462 #cabinet 1 0 0 0 0
5 3297 #sudan 0 1 0 0 0
6 2846 #Custodian_of_the_Two_Holy_Mosques 1 0 0 0 1
7 2696 #Custodian_of_the_Two_Mosques 1 0 0 0 1
8 2581 #iraq 0 1 0 0 0
9 2514 #turkey 0 1 0 0 0
10 2496 #the_alliance 0 1 0 1 0
11 2405 #syria 0 1 0 0 0
12 2287 #education 1 0 0 0 0
13 2264 #aramco 1 0 0 0 0
14 2231 #lebanon 0 1 0 0 0
15 2197 #economy 1 0 0 0 0
16 2030 #egypt 0 1 0 0 0
17 2018 #Trump 0 1 0 0 0
18 1820 #Washington 0 1 0 0 0
19 1818 #UAE 0 1 0 0 0
20 1705 #america 0 1 0 0 0
21 1412 #britain 0 1 0 0 0
22 1396 #kuwait 0 1 0 0 0
23 1340 #houthi 0 1 0 1 0
24 1243 #libya 0 1 0 0 0
25 1242 #qatar 0 1 0 0 0
26 1213 #algeria 0 1 0 0 0
27 1160 #tunisia 0 1 0 0 0
28 1150 #bahrain 0 1 0 0 0
29 1140 #russia 0 1 0 0 0
30 1138 #commerce 1 0 0 0 0
31 1105 #pakistan 0 1 0 0 0
32 1084 #oil 1 0 0 0 0
32 1084 #jobs 1 0 0 0 0
33 1070 #king_salman 1 0 0 0 1
34 945 #economic_reports 1 0 0 0 0
35 935 #india 0 1 0 0 0
36 889 #civil_defence 1 0 0 0 0
37 867 #public_prosecution 1 0 0 0 0
38 844 #france 0 1 0 0 0
39 826 #mohammed_bin_salman 1 0 0 0 1
39 826 #houthis 0 1 0 1 0
40 813 #palestine 0 1 0 0 0
41 759 #Tehran 0 1 1 0 0
42 752 #economy 1 0 0 0 0
43 735 #citizens_account 1 0 0 0 0
44 728 #shura_council 1 0 0 0 0
45 714 #arab summit 0 1 0 0 0
46 687 #employment 1 0 0 0 0
47 643 #UN 0 1 0 0 0
48 630 #civil_service 1 0 0 0 0
49 628 #new zealand 0 1 0 0 0
50 627 #ministry_of_education 1 0 0 0 0
51 625 #justice 1 0 0 0 0
52 585 #sanaa 0 1 0 0 0
53 581 #ameerca 0 1 0 0 0
54 568 #jordan 0 1 0 0 0
55 557 #Tramp 0 1 0 0 0
56 549 #crownprinceinindia 0 1 0 0 1
57 548 #ISIS 0 1 0 0 0
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58 546 #khalid_bin_faisal 1 0 0 0 0
59 544 #interior_ministry 1 0 0 0 0
60 543 #police 1 0 0 0 0
61 538 #riyadh_agreement 0 1 0 0 0
62 505 #justice_ministry 1 0 0 0 0
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Table A.12: Most mentioned IO accounts in SA, GEO, TOP, and NEWS
samples combined.
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Additional analyses
(a) Kernel density scatter plots of retweets for tweets mentioning domestic political
hashtags in IO accounts and four benchmark samples.
(b) Kernel density scatter plots of retweets for tweets mentioning foreign political
hashtags in IO accounts and four benchmark samples.
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(c) Kernel density scatter plots of retweets for tweets mentioning Iran-related
hashtags in IO accounts and four benchmark samples.
(d) Kernel density scatter plots of retweets for tweets mentioning Yemen-related
hashtags in IO accounts and four benchmark samples.
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(e) Kernel density scatter plots of retweets for tweets mentioning Saudi royal
family-related hashtags in IO accounts and four benchmark samples.
Figure A.1. Kernel density scatter plots of retweets for tweets mention-
ing different political hashtags in IO accounts and four benchmark samples.
Overlaid boxplots show median, first, and third quartiles of distribution.
Figure A.2. Comparison of GEO and SA sample characteristics.
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Figure A.3. Distribution of news topics in Saudi IO Tweets.
